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threat of destruction arising from a conspiracy to destroy the property.
The federal law could be said to prohibit the conduct but in order to pro-
tect its communications network across the entire country in the interest
of national defense. Distinct interests could almost always be noted and
the result would probably not differ from that reached under the concep-
tualistic "dual sovereignty" theory.
A counterargument to the "protection of interests" rationale would
be that both state and federal laws protect the same interests and one
prosecution vindicates both laws.
Regardless of which rationalization for the Lanz.a rule is preferred
the rule itself is in conflict with common law precedents and we ought to
examine our reasons for the departure to insure that they are as sound
as the reasons for the rule.
OBJECTIONS TO FORMER TESTIMONY
Testimony given in a prior trial may be admissible in evidence as
either an exception to the hearsay rule' or not hearsay at all.2 This theo-
retical difference of opinion, however, does not control the admissibility
of former testimony if certain conditions precedent are fulfilled. The
conditions which must be met before former testimony will be admitted
fall into two groups; one, those having to do with the witness's avail-
ability; and two, those establishing the relevance of the former testimony
to the present proceeding.
Before any part of his former testimony is admissible, the witness
must be dead, insane, so disabled as to be unable to testify,3 a nonresident
not subject to process,' absent by procurement of the opposing party,' or
a resident whom counsel in the exercise of due diligence cannot locate.'
The same conditions for admissibility appear to apply in both criminal
1. McCord v. Strader, 227 Ind. 389, 86 N.E.2d 441 (1949); McCoRMICK, HAND-
1300K OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 480 (1954).
2. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1370 (3rd ed. 1940) ; see also Smith v. U.S., 106 F.2d
726 (1939).
3. See, e.g., Pittman v. State, 272 P.2d 458 (Okla. Cr. 1954). The witness was in
an advanced stage of pregnancy. The court considered her unable to attend and ad-
mitted her former testimony.
4. See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Koonce, 233 Ala. 265, 171 So. 269 (1936).
5. Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
6. E.g., N.Y. Cent. R.R. v. Pinnell, Adm'r, 112 Ind. App. 116, 40 N.E.2d 988 (1942);
United Tel. Co. v. Barva, 83 Ind. App. 61, 147 N.E. 716 (1925) ; Wilson v. State, 175
Ind. 458, 93 N.E. 609 (1911).
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and civil proceedings.7 In criminal cases the constitutional question of
the right to confront witnesses was resolved early by a holding that con-
frontation once during the proceedings with opportunity to cross-examine
satisfied the constitutional guarantee so the witness's absence does not
bar the use of his former testimony in later trials.'
Relevancy to the present proceeding is established by comparing
parties and issues. In general the parties in the proceeding in which the
former testimony is offered must be substantially identical with those in
the proceeding in which the testimony was originally taken.' A nominal
change of parties is immaterial if there is privity in blood, estate, or
law ;1" and the issues on which the former testimony is offered must be
substantially the same as those on which it was originally accepted."
There must have been either actual cross-examination of the witness in
the original proceeding" or the opportunity to cross-examine.' The
kind of proceeding at which the former testimony was elicited does not
control its admissibility at a subsequent proceeding as long as there is
substantial identity of issues and parties and the opportunity to cross-
examine was present at the original proceeding.14
Objections to former testimony can be classified as objections to the
whole testimony or to specific parts of it. In the first class lie objec-
tions based on privileges, relevancy, materiality, and competency of the
whole body of the testimony; in the second class, the total gamut of
objections that can be made to specific parts of any testimony. The
purpose here is to investigate whether the failure to raise these objections
at the time the testimony was first taken prohibits raising them when
the former testimony is offered at a subsequent proceeding.
7. See Zimmerman v. State, 190 Ind. 537, 130 N.E. 235 (1921) ; and State v. Stead-
man, 216 S.C. 579, 59 S.E.2d 168 (1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 850 (1950).
S. Wilson v. State, 175 Ind. 458, 93 N.E. 609 (1911) ; Mattox v. U.S., 156 U.S. 237
(1895). In the latter case it was said that the right to confrontation was meant only to
prevent the introduction of cx parte affidavits or depositions.
9. E.g., Lake Erie & W. R.R. v. Huffman, Adm'r, 177 Ind. 126, 97 N.E. 434 (1912).
10. Indianapolis & St. Louis R.R. v. Stout, Adm'r, 53 Ind. 143 (1876).
11. E.g., Traveler's Fire Ins. Co. v. Wright, 322 P.2d 417 (Okla. 1958). The
former testimony from a criminal prosecution for arson on the point of the defendant's
procuring the arson was admitted in a subsequent civil action by the acquitted defendant
against the insurer.
12. E.g., Stearsman v. State, 237 Ind. 149, 143 N.E.2d 81 (1957). Here the witness
died of a heart attack during cross-examination. On a subsequent trial the state was
allowed to introduce only that part of the former testimony on which defendant's counsel
had actually cross-examined.
13. State v. Logan, 344 Mo. 351, 126 S.W.2d 256 (1939) ; People v. Green, 152 Cal.
App. 2d 886, 313 P.2d 955 (1957) ; State v. Stewart, 85 Kan. 404, 116 P. 489 (1911);
People v. Redstone, 139 Cal. App. 2d 485, 293 P.2d 880 (1956).
14. Traveler's Fire Ins. Co. v. Wright, 322 P.2d 417 (Okla. 1958); Wellden v.
Roberts, 37 Ala. App. 1, 67 So. 2d 69 (1952).
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The introduction of former testimony where the witness is dead,
insane, disabled, or cannot be found rests on the fact that the witness is
physically unavailable to testify vive voce at the proceeding in which the
former testimony is offered. Logically, if the witness is available and
competent to testify his former testimony should be excluded simply
because one of the primary conditions for its admission has not been
met. 5 Yet a situation may arise in either a civil or criminal trial where
the witness is both available and competent but seeks refuge in a privilege.
In criminal cases it is generally held that if a presently available witness
(not a party) takes refuge in his privilege against self-incrimination his
testimony given in a prior proceeding may be introduced in evidence."
The reasons given in these cases for admitting the former testimony are:
first, by refusing to testify, the witness has made himself "unavailable" ;1"
and second, even though the witness is physically available, the unavail-
ability of his vive voce testimony permits admission of the former testi-
mony.'" The second ground is only a technical refinement of the first.
But, regardless of the rationale upon which the decisions are based, the
rule admitting former testimony has been extended to permit the admis-
sion of former testimony despite a witness's claim of the privilege against
self-incrimination by simply extending the concept of unavailability. It
should be noted that the witness has not waived his present privilege not
to testify; only his former testimony is admitted.
In criminal prosecutions, too, the defendant's former testimony has
been admitted after the defendant exercised his privilege against self-
incrimination. 9 It is questionable whether such admission of the de-
fendant's former testimony should be considered an extension of the
former testimony rule even though functionally parallel to the situation as
to witnesses. When the criminal defendant refuses to testify he does so
as a matter of privilege. Although this may make his vive voce testimony
unavailable it would seem a perversion to use the exercise of the privilege
as the reason for introducing the defendant's possibly incriminating
former testimony. A better reason for the admission of the defendant's
15. Rio Grande So. Ry. v. Campbell, 55 Col. 493, 136 P. 68 (1913), supports this
proposition.
16. E.g., Woodward v. State, 21 Ala. App. 417, 109 So. 119 (1926) ; State v. Reidie,
142 Kan. 290, 46 P.2d 601 (1935); People v. Pickett, 339 Mich. 294, 63 N.W.2d 681
(1954) ; Exelton v. State, 30 Okla. Cr. 224, 235 P. 627 (1925). Contra, Pleau v. State,
255 Wis. 362, 28 N.W.2d 496 (1949).
17. People v. Pickett, supra note 16; State v. Reidie, supra note 16.
18. Exelton v. State, 30 Okla. Cr. 224, 235 P. 627 (1925) ; Woodward v. State, 21
Ala. App. 417, 109 So. 119 (1926).
19. State v. Simmons, 78 Kan. 852, 98 P. 277 (1908) ; U.S. v. Grunewald, 164 F.
Supp. 644 (1938).
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former testimony would be to consider it as a voluntary admission." The
voluntary admission basis for admissibility is broader than the former
testimony rule as to defendants and has been used, by at least one court,
to secure the admission of prior testimony held excludable under the
former testimony rule.21 Consistent with considering the defendant's
prior testimony as an admission rather than as former testimony is the
limitation that if the testimony in a preliminary criminal hearing had
been given without knowledge of the privilege, it is excludable.2
Parallel to the self-incrimination privilege of a witness is the privi-
lege of a spouse to refuse to testify against the marriage partner. Testi-
mony given by a spouse in a previous proceeding is admissible later even
though the spouse claims his privilege.2" By analogy one may say that
the same result should obtain for other privileges as well. For example,
the former testimony of a doctor or lawyer, following the pattern estab-
lished for other privileges in relation to former testimony, would be ad-
missible over the claim of a privileged communication by a patient or
client.
The preceding discussion as to the unavailability of the witness or
of the vive voce testimony as permitting the admission of former testi-
mony over a claim of privilege does not bear directly on the problem of
objections to the merits of former testimony. Thus, once the founda-
tion is laid for the admission of former testimony by showing that the
parties and issues are the same, that there was opportunity for cross-
examination in the original proceeding, and that the witness is now un-
available for some reason other than the exercise of a privilege, is the
former testimony open to objections going to its evidentiary merits?
It is clear that portions of the testimony properly related to the
parties and issues to which objections were sustained at the first pro-
ceeding are not admissible at the second.24 If the objection is made and
overruled during the first trial can the objecting party successfully raise
the same objection to the former testimony during the second trial? In
the one case found on point2' an objection to competency was overruled
20. In U.S. v. Grunewald, supra note 19, the court states three grounds for the ad-
mission of the defendant's former testimony: one, voluntary waiver of privilege (but as
noted in the text the witness did not have to testify vive voce) ; two, the witness was "un-
available"; and three, the testimony was a voluntary admission.
21. West v. State, 24 Ariz. 237, 208 P. 412 (1922).
22. State v. Harriot, 248 Iowa 25, 79 N.W.2d 332 (1956) ; People v. Mora, 120 Cal.
App. 2d 896, 262 P.2d 594 (1953).
23. Wyatt v. State, 35 Ala. App. 147, 46 So. 2d 837 (1950) ; McCoy v. State, 221
Ala. 466, 129 So. 21 (1930) ; State v. Stewart, 85 Kan. 404, 116 P. 489 (1911).
24. Illinois Bankers Life Ass'n v. Theodore, 47 Ariz. 312, 55 P.2d 806 (1936).
25. Garrett v. Weinberg, 54 S.C. 127, 31 S.E. 341, rearguntent denied, 34 S.E. 70
(1898).
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at the first trial and again at the second when the former testimony was
offered. The ruling was not appealed until after the second trial. On
the appeal it was held to have been error to admit the incompetent testi-
mony over objection in the second proceeding. In this instance there
was clearly no waiver of objection since an objection was made at the first
trial. The primary area of confusion in regard to former testimony lies,
however, in the circumstances when no objection to the admissibility was
taken at the first proceeding.
In reference to evidentiary merit a distinction must be made between
the concepts of materiality and relevancy and the concept of competency.
Materiality and relevancy appear functionally related to the criteria of
similarity of issues and parties in the former testimony rule; competency
is not so related to similarity of issues and parties, but rather refers to
the personal trustworthiness and testimonial qualification of a witness.
The problem of objections to former testimony reflects this basic dis-
tinction. Thus the problem of objections to materiality would appear to
be partially controlled by the determinations as to similarity of parties
and issues. Obviously if the issues upon which the testimony was orig-
inally taken differ substantially from those on which it is later offered
the testimony would be immaterial in the subsequent proceeding. If the
issues were the same or substantially alike and the testimony originally
material it would also be material in the later proceeding. But, even if
the issues were the same, if the testimony were immaterial in the first
proceeding and not objected to or excluded, is it excludable when offered
as former testimony? No cases have been found on this last point. It
can be assumed, perhaps, that rarely if ever would an attorney either
attempt to introduce or fail to object to testimony in general immaterial.
Identity of issues also partially controls relevancy. If the offered
testimony is immaterial to the issues it is also likely to be irrelevant to
any proposition requiring proof. However, testimony may be material
as within the issues yet irrelevant as not probative of the proposition to
which it is directed. If material but irrelevant testimony is given at the
first proceeding and not objected to can it be successfully objected to
when offered as former testimony? Again, no cases have been found
with holdings specifically answering this question. Perhaps, as with
materiality, the question may be moot.
The cases are split on the general question of whether new objec-
tions, either to the whole of the testimony or only to a part of it, should
be sustained if meritorious, or overruled because waived in an earlier
proceeding. In England and in some American jurisdictions such new
objections have been sustained and the testimony excluded in a second
458
proceeding. In England the rule is that former testimony is open to the
same objections as if the witness were personally present and testifying."
This rule would clearly permit new objections of almost every category
to be entered against the former testimony.
In the United States, however, such a clear and unanimous rule has
not been laid down. The general rule in evidence is that objections not
timely taken are waived. The major exception to this in regard to
former testimony appears in favor of objections to the general or spe-
cific competency of a witness, although the latter may be doubtful. The
few cases on record which treat the specific problem do not present a
clear rationale for either sustaining or overruling new objections. In
Petrie v. Cohmbia & G. Ry.21 the record testimony admitted without ob-
jection at the first trial was the testimony of a witness taken at a cor-
oner's inquest and incompetent as hearsay. On the second trial the same
testimony was excluded on objection as incompetent. The of feror argued
that the admission of the testimony at the first trial without objection
constituted a waiver of any objection to competency and thus the testimony
should have been admitted also at the second trial. On appeal the argu-
ment was rejected. The court stated that a second trial is a trial de novo29
and should be conducted as if a previous trial had not occurred. There-
fore, the former testimony should be open to any new objection. Simi-
larly in Meekins v. Norfolk & S. Ry. ° incompetent hearsay was admitted
in the first trial without objection and was admitted over objection as
former testimony in the second trial. On appeal it was held to be error
to admit the former hearsay testimony on the ground that if the witness
were alive and testifying z'ive voce such hearsay could be objected to
successfully.
In Arsnow v. Red Top Cab Co."' no question was raised during the
first trial as to the plaintiff's competency to testify. After a mistrial the
plaintiff (Arsnow) committed suicide. His wife, as substituted plain-
tiff, sought in the second trial to introduce the deceased's testimony from
the prior trial; at the same time the wife alleged that Arsnow was insane
at the time of the first trial and that the insanity was caused by injuries
allegedly due to the defendant's negligence. The defendant objected to
the introduction of the former testimony on the ground of the incom-
26. PHiPsoN, EVIDENCE 458 (9th ed. 1952).
27. 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 18 (3rd ed. 1940).
28. 29 S.C. 303, 7 S.E. 515 (1888).
29. Similarly, in Garrett v. Weinberg, 54 S.C. 127, 31 S.E. 341; rearguinent denied,
34 S.E. 70 (1898) the court appeared to base its decision on the concept of a new trial
proceeding as if there had not been a prior trial.
30. 136 N.C. 1, 48 S.E. 501 (1904).
31. 159 Wash. 137, 292 P. 436 (1930).
NOTES 459
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petency of the witness; specifically, the insanity of Arsnow as alleged by
his wife. On appeal it was held that the former testimony should have
been excluded. If the plaintiff-wife's allegation of insanity was taken
as true, then Arsnow's testimony was incompetent when first given. This
incompetency was not waived by a failure to object since it was not in
issue at the first trial. In this analysis the Arsnow case is consistent with
the Petrie, Meekins, and Garrett cases in holding that there is no waiver
of objection to the competency of former testimony when the witness
was incompetent originally. Calley v. Bostonr & M. Ry" supports an ex-
tension of this rule where only the witness's competency to answer a par-
ticular question is first challenged on the introduction of his former
testimony.
Analyzed in another manner the Arsnow case would support the
proposition that former testimony can be objected to as incompetent on
the second trial even if the witness were competent at the time of the
first. The fundamental inconsistency of the plaintiff's position in al-
leging Arsnow to have been insane at the time of the first trial and also
using his testimony to prove important parts of the case operated against
her. She could not both urge the insanity of Arsnow and the competency
of his testimony at the same time after his death when there was no op-
portunity to appraise his capacity. A similar situation in Louisville & N.
Ry. v. Scott3" led to the exclusion of former testimony at the second trial
which had been competent at the first. There the plaintiff impeached a
witness for the defense at the first trial. Subsequently the witness died.
At the second trial when the plaintiff attempted to introduce the witness's
testimony from the first trial the defendant's objection to it was sustained.
It was held to be no error to, exclude the former testimony impeaching
the witness since the plaintiff by introducing it made the witness his own
and he could not be allowed to impeach his own witness. In this and
in the Arsnow case the party inroducing the former testimony supplied the
ground for exclusion. Both cases appear unusual, but if taken broadly
would support the conclusion that former testimony is open to objection
on a ground of incompetency arising between the time of the two trials.
Most of the cases which appear to take the contrary position-that
objections not made when the testimony was first taken are waived for
future proceedings, whether the objection existed at the first trial or arose
later-can be distinguished. Among these cases are those where the in-
32. 93 N.H. 359, 42 A.2d 329 (1945). Objection to competency of expert to testify
to fact not in his knowledge not waived. Contra, State v. White, 61 N.M. 109, 295 P.2d
1019 (1956). Objection to competency of neurosurgeon to testify as to defendant's
sanity held waived.
33. 232 Ala. 284, 167 So. 572 (1936).
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competency is imposed by a dead man statute. Where the administrator
failed to object to the capacity of the adversely interested party to testify
on the first trial, he waived his objection to the former testimony of the
party in any subsequent proceeding.34 Waiver is the obvious basis of this
holding. The administrator was a party in both trials and his initial
waiver of objection to the witness's incompetency under the dead man
statute carried over to the second trial. In a similar case3" the plaintiff
testified fully in his own behalf at the first trial. After a verdict for the
plaintiff the defendant secured a new trial but died before it took place.
Under the dead man statute the plaintiff was considered personally in-
competent to testify in the new trial, but it was held error to exclude his
former testimony as well. Here the incompetency was imposed by the
intervening death of a party. There was no waiver of the incompetency
of the witness by the administrator and although the witness was not
permitted to testify, his former testimony was admissible, apparently be-
cause the witness was considered unavailable. The result appears il-
logical; the witness was incompetent but his testimony was not. There
was no violation, however, of the dead man statute at the time the testi-
mony was taken and the technicality of the former testimony rule per-
mitted the court to avoid the effect of the statute in the later trial. The
cases are so rare in which former testimony is used to subvert the policy
of a dead man statute that they should be distinguished on that ground
and not used as sources to formulate the common law of objections to
former testimony.
Other cases which appear to support the proposition that objections
to former testimony are waived if not taken at the first trial can be limited
in that the objections waived were to form alone; specifically that the
answer in the former testimony was not responsive to the question,3" or
that the objections were made to leading questions in the transcript of the
former testimony.37 In these instances the questions could have been re-
framed, or the answers recast, if the objections had been made in the first
proceeding.
The distinction between objections going only to the form of the
former testimony as opposed to those going to its substantive competency
has been suggested as a basis for rationalizing all the divergent cases and
for furnishing a general rule on objections to former testimony."5 This
distinction has some merit. It suffers primarily from an absence of sub-
34. In re Harris' Estate, 154 Ohio St. 367, 95 N.E.2d 769 (1950).
35. Habig v. Bastion, 117 Fla. 864, 158 So. 508 (1934).
36. Sherman Gas & Elec. Co. v. Belden, 103 Tex. 59, 123 S.W. 119 (1909).
37. People v. Britt, 62 Cal. App. 674, 217 P. 767 (1923).
38. Annot., 159 A.L.R. 119, at 120 (1945) ; 8 MINN. L. REv. 629.
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stantiating cases decided on waiver of objections to form only from
those jurisdictions which have permitted objections to the substantive
competency of the former testimony. Furthermore, in the cases cited for
the proposition that objection to competency is not waived, there is also
much dicta paralleling the English rule that there is no waiver of any
objections to former testimony.3" It is still questionable how these juris-
dictions would treat objections to form only. And, finally, although text
writers have stated that new objections going to materiality, relevancy,
and competency may be made against former testimony,4" the cases sup-
port the proposition only insofar as the competency of the former wit-
ness may be challenged.
THE STANDARD FAMILY COURT ACT APPRAISED
For the last few years literature has abounded with articles dis-
cussing and proposing solutions to one of our country's gravest prob-
lems-how to curtail the breakdown of homes through divorce and the
lowering of moral standards as manifested by increased crime and de-
linquency. A family court has received the largest countenance of the
numerous proposals and is operative in parts of a few states.' The Na-
tional Probation and Parole Association Journal for April, 1959 presents
a Standard Family Court Act 2 for consideration by the states. The
function of this paper is to evaluate this proposal in light of the many
social and legal implications which it seeks to resolve and which it creates.
Perhaps a brief digression laying the proper concept of the fam-
ily court will be helpful to those unfamiliar with this topic. A family
court is "a court with jurisdiction plus facilities to handle all manner of
justiciable family problems."'  The jurisdiction of a family court in-
39. Meekins v. Norfolk & S. Ry., 136 N.C. 1, 48 S.E. 501 (1904); Petrie v. Co-
lumbia & G. Ry., 29 S.C. 303, 7 S.E. 515 (1888) ; Garrett v. Weinberg, 54 S.C. 127, 31
S.E. 341, rearguinent denied, 34 S.E. 70 (1898). These three cases state the English
general rule, but in all three only competency of the witness was in issue. In Calley v.
Boston & M. Ry., 93 N.H. 359, 42 A.2d 329 (1945) the pertinent dictum is that former
testimony is open to all objections as though it were the witness's deposition.
40. McCoRM cx, EVIDENCE 497 (1954); Annot., 159 A.L.R. 119 at 120 (1945).
1. See Chute, Divorce and the Family Court, 18 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
49 (1953), for a brief history.
2. The act was prepared by the Committee on the Standard Family Court Act of
the National Probation and Parole Association in cooperation with the National Council
of Juvenile Court Judges and the U. S. Children's Bureau. An appendix following this
note contains the text of the act.
3. Alexander, What is a Family Court, An.yway?, 26 CONN. B.J. 243, 245 (1952).
